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Social representations theory has long been interested in narratives (e.g., Bauer, 1996; Flick, 
1995; Jovchelovich, 2002; László, 1997). One of the reasons for this interest is that narratives by 
their communicative nature resist individualistic and universalistic approaches. Stories are rather 
social and cultural phenomena: particular ways of constructing webs of meanings or 
psychological realities (Bruner, 1986). Another long term interest of SR theory is relating the 
social identity of people to social representations of their world (e.g., Breakwell, 1993; Duveen, 
2001). We will argue in the present paper that a) social representations of history or collective 
memory are narratively constructed (László, Ehmann & Imre, 2002; Wertsch, 2002); b) narrative 
representations of history are intimately related to group identity (c.f. László, 2003; Liu & 
László, 2007) and, c) particular ways of narrative construction  of history refer to psychological 
aspects of group identity (László, 2008). We will also demonstrate how social representations of 
history and group identity (e.g., national identity) can be studied quantitatively, through 
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computerized content analysis of historical narratives and how this enables empirically founded 
theoretical generalizations. 
Recently, we have developed a new direction of narrative psychology, which draws on 
the scientific traditions of psychological study, but adds to the existing theories by pursuing the 
empirical study of psychological meaning construction (László, 2008, 2011). Scientific narrative 
psychology takes seriously the interrelations between language and human psychological processes, 
more precisely between narrative and identity. This is what discriminates it from earlier 
psychometric studies, which established correlations between language use and psychological 
states (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003; Tausczik & 
Pennebaker, 2010). It assumes that studying narratives as vehicles of complex psychological 
contents leads to empirically based knowledge about human social adaptation. Individuals in their 
life stories, just like groups in their group histories, compose their significant life episodes. In this 
composition, which is meaning construction in itself, they express the ways in which they organize 
their relations to the social world, or construct their identity. Organizational characteristics and 
experiential qualities of these stories tell about the potential behavioral adaptation and the coping 
capacities of the storytellers. 
Another remarkable novelty comes from the recognition of correspondences between 
narrative organization and psychological organization, namely from the fact that narrative 
features of self-narratives, e.g. the characters’ functions, the temporal characteristics of the story, 
or the speakers’ perspectives will provide information about the features and conditions of self-
representations. In this sense, scientific narrative psychology exploits achievements of 
narratology (e.g., Barthes, 1977; Culler, 2001; Eco, 1994; Genette, 1980).  However, whereas 
narratology studies effects of narrative composition on readers’ understanding and experience, 
scientific narrative psychology is directed to how narrative composition reflects inner states of 
the narrator. Narratology has described a finite number of constituents and a finite number of 
variants of these constituents concerning the composition of narratives. Each constituent, or 
narrative category can reliably be identified at the level of the text. At the same time meanings at 
the level of experience can be associated with the constituents of narrative thus defined. Narrative 
contains a finite number of structural or compositional ‘slots’ that can be filled with an equally 
finite number of psychologically meaningful contents, while the surface text may show infinite 
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variety. This provides ground for developing linguistic algorithms which map psychologically 
meaningful narrative categories with respect to identity states and identity qualities. 
 
NARRATIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Narrative social psychology as an empirical enterprise, i.e. as a branch of scientific narrative 
psychology explores group-identity relevant features in narrative language. Whereas mainstream 
social psychology investigates language as a mediator of group perception (c.f. the linguistic 
intergroup bias described by Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989), narrative social psychology 
relates language to identity functions such as stability, integrity, continuity, positive value, 
autonomy, control, and so forth. It considers narrative composition in the sense of how  
emotionality, cognition, evaluation and agency are distributed in intergroup relations, and draws 
inferences to identity states of strength or vulnerability, emotional regulation, defense 
mechanisms etc. of particular ethnic or national identities. Thus, it measures narrative 
composition of intergroup psychological phenomena and interprets them with reference to group 
identity.  
 
Identity-Relevant Social Psychological Composition in Group Narratives 
 
In this section we introduce four premises to study social representations of history, their narrative 
composition and relation to group identity. 
Intergroup agency. Agency seems to be a major category in narrative construction. At the 
same time, it is one of the basic dimensions underlying judgments of self, persons and groups. It 
refers to task functioning and goal achievement, and involves qualities like ‘efficient’, 
‘competent’, ‘active’, ‘persistent’, and ‘energetic’ (Wojciszke & Abele, 2008).  
Not only individuals but also groups are seen as agents as they are capable of performing 
goal-directed behaviour and also have an effect on their environment. ‘influence others’; ‘achieve 
its goals’, ‘act collectively’ and ‘make things happen (produce outcomes)’.  
At least in Western cultures, agency is an important component of personal and social 
identity. Distribution of agency between in-group and out-group appears to be a sensitive 
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indicator for group identity. High level of agency in negative events reflects accepting 
responsibility for past failures, whereas assigning agency in these events only to outgroups 
indicates defensive identity with low control  and low level of elaboration of historical traumas. If 
ingroup agency is prevalent in both positive and negative events it indicates a stable, well-
organized and autonomous identity and a progress in trauma elaboration. On the contrary, high 
level ingroup agency in positive, victorious events and low level outgroup agency in the same 
events accompanied with low level of ingroup agency in negative events suggests inflated but 
instable identity. 
Intergroup evaluation. Intergroup evaluation is an essential linguistic tool for narrative 
identity construction that organizes the narrated historical events and its characters into a 
meaningful and coherent representation. Intergroup evaluations are explicit social judgments that 
evaluate the groups concerned in the event or their representatives. These evaluations can be (1) 
positive and negative attributions assigned to them or to their actions (e.g., wise, unjust), (2) 
emotional reactions and relations to them (e.g., admire, scorn), (3) evaluative interpretations 
referring to their actions (instead of or beside factual description, e.g., excel, exploit), and (4) acts 
of rewarding and punishment or acknowledgement and criticism (e.g., cheer, protest). 
Intergroup evaluation plays an essential role in the maintenance of positive social identity 
(Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, in an intergroup context, interpersonal and 
intergroup evaluation shows bias both on the behavioral and on the linguistic level whose 
motivational basis is the demand for a positive social identity. The evaluation bias intensifies in 
intergroup conflicts: ingroup value increases, outgroup value decreases.  If this bias in the 
accounts of past conflicts is still  persistent in contemporary historical narratives, it suggests that 
the group still experiences historical conflicts as identity threats and strengthens its positive 
identity and cohesion by enhancing its historical greatness. 
Collective emotions. There is a tradition in social psychology of emotions looking back to 
early cultural anthropology (Mead, 1937; Benedict, 1946), which claims that certain emotions 
and emotional patterns are characteristic of certain cultures. This tradition has been further 
developed in contemporary cultural psychology (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997; Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). Not culturally, but 
socially conditioned relatively stable emotional orientations are currently also assumed (Bar-Tal, 
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2001; Bar-Tal, Halperin & de Rivera, 2007). Being a member of and identified with a group, 
people think and feel in accord with the group’s characteristic emotional orientation. One of the 
emotional orientations which has been researched in more detail is the collective victimhood 
orientation (Bar-Tal et al., 2009), which means that the group turns to intergroup situations with 
emotions of an innocent victim. 
Emotions that the ingroup experiences as well as emotions assigned to outgroups in 
narratives about the group’s past reflect the emotional orientation characteristic to the group by 
being an un-detachable part of the identity of the group. In turn, these emotions derive from the 
representations of the past. Master narratives of nations which clearly have emotional entailments 
are called narrative templates by Wertsch (2002), or charters by Liu and Hilton (2005) following 
Malinowski (1926). We prefer to call them historical trajectories (László, 2011; Fülöp, Csertő, 
Ilg, Szabó, Slugoski & László, 2012), because emotions can be related best to the different 
sequential patterns of the nation’s victories and failures as they became preserved in its collective 
memory.  
Functionality of emotional orientations has also been studied. Whereas adopting a 
collective victim role in the nation’s identity may seriously hinder intergroup communication and 
conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009), the optimistic American 
narrative (Bellah, 1967) is oriented to redemption (McAdams, 2006).  
Cognitive states and perspectives. The occurrence of cognitive states assigned to ingroup 
and outgroup can best be interpreted from the angle of national identity when elaboration of past 
traumas is studied. According to this interpretation, the more cognitive states and processes 
(thinking, reasoning, etc.) appear in both ingroup and outgroup, the further the trauma elaboration 
has progressed (Pennebaker, 1993; Paez et al., 1997; see also Vincze, Ilg & Pólya, 2012). In this 
sense, frequency of cognitive states in historical narratives on ethnic or national traumas indicates 
the process of trauma elaboration toward a coherent, emotionally stable group identity. There are, 
however, other possibilities of the interpretation of the presence of cognitive states in historical 
narratives. For instance, Vincze and Rein (2011) have shown that the propositional content of 
cognitive states may overwrite the trauma elaboration interpretation (e.g., “The entente decided to 
punish Hungary”). In these cases negative propositional contents of the perpetrator outgroups’ 
cognitive states serves assigning deliberation and thereby even more responsibility to outgroups 
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for bad deeds. These maneuvers probably do not promote the reconciliation with the traumatic 
loss, rather add to maintaining the emotionally disturbing experience. 
Another aspect of cognitive (and emotional) states in narrative is psychological 
perspective taking. This function is also related to identity states in as much as it allows for 
entering the outgroup’s perspective in historical narrative. It is obvious that people having a 
stable, emotionally balanced, future oriented ethno-national identity can afford to appear the 
perspective of former enemies in their historical accounts.  
Historical narratives always have at least three perspectives. There is the ingroup 
(internal) perspective represented by ingroup members taking part in the events, the outgroup 
(external) perspective, represented by outgroup members, and the perspective of the narrator, 
who is usually, but not necessarily, a member of the ingroup and sees the events from a physical 
and temporal distance. The narrator’s perspective prevails in most historical accounts, and this 
fact strengthens the categorical empathy of the group members who are exposed to these 
narratives in as much as the group is affected in the story. Given that cognitive process attributed 
to outgroups as a whole or individual outgroup members introduce an outgroup perspective, 
which in turn may set into motion a different form of empathy, that is situational, i.e. leads to a 
more balanced representation of the events (Hogan, 2003). Propositional content of the cognitive 
processes and outcome valence of the event, i.e. whether it was good or bad for the ingroup or the 
outgroup cannot be neglected in this analysis either. Enhanced situational empathy as a 
consequence of perspectivisation through cognitive processes and a better understanding of the 
historical event which may contribute to improving intergroup relations through abolishing 
stereotypes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vincze, Ilg & Pólya, 2012) will only occur if 
outgroup enemies are endowed with cognitive (and emotional) processes which go beyond the 
hostility and the unanimously negative consequences for the ingroup in their propositional 
content. Such an analysis of cognitive processes and perspectivization from the angle of group 
identity, which also considers relations to different outgroups in a wider historical span, i.e. 
numbers and types of outgroups who are endowed with own perspective in a historical period, 
provides information on group identity with respect to its stability, plasticity and future 
orientation. In the next section we will explain how these four social psychological premises are 
taken into account in the content analytic device we have developed. 
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NARRATIVE CATEGORICAL CONTENT ANALYSIS (NarrCat) 
 
The computerized content analytic methodology we have developed rests on the psychologically 
relevant features of narrative composition or narrative categories. It is not the psychological 
correlates of words, word types (e.g. function words versus content words) or grammatical 
features (e.g. past tense) that interest us. Instead, following the principles of narrative 
composition, we are interested in the spatio-temporal perspective structure, the internal versus 
external perspective, the self-other and ingroup-outgroup emotion structure, evaluation structures, 
distribution of cognitive processes between characters and groups, etc. The program package 
NarrCat we have developed consists of hierarchically ordered modules for narrative categories 
and relational modules (see Figure 1). 
Local Grammars (Graphs) Dictionaries
Social References
NARRATIVE CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
Submodules
Semantic Role 
Labeling
NARRATIVE CATEGORICAL MODULES
(Psycho-Thematic Modules)
Negation
 
Figure 1. The overall structure of NarrCat 
 
NarrCat allows social psychologists to “convert” the content of narratives into 
psychologically relevant, statistically processable narrative categories. For narrative psychology, 
the sentence “I love Peter”, for example, is translated into a meaning “Self as Agent’s Positive 
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Emotion toward Other as Recipient”. Or: “In 1241, the Mongol troops attacked Hungary” is 
translated as “Outgroup as Agent’s negative activity toward Ingroup as Recipient in the past”.  
The structure of NarrCat follows bottom-up logic. Similar to other computerized content 
analytic devices, e.g. LIWC (Pennebaker et al, 2001), RID (Martindale, 1975), General Inquirer 
(Stone et al., 1966), NarrCat also has dictionaries. Dictionary words and idioms are identified by 
Local Grammars and Graphs (both terms come from corpus linguistic terminology). These 
structural components perform several technical tasks, not detailed here – such as disambiguation 
of meaning, e.g. through anaphora and coreference resolution. 
At a higher level, dictionary words and idioms are arranged into Submodules. 
Submodules are building blocks of even higher level components, Psycho-Thematic Modules and 
Relational Modules. Forming the main body of the NarrCat, the Psycho-Thematic Modules 
include Agency, Evaluation, Emotion, Cognition, Spatiality and Temporality, all composed of 
their respective Submodules (for example, the Emotionality Psycho-Thematic Module consists of 
Submodules like Positive and Negative Emotions, Abstract and Concrete Emotions, and so on). 
The Relational Modules include Social References, Semantic Role Labeling and 
Negation. The Social References Module categorizes first, second and third person categories (I, 
We, You, etc.) and ingroup and outgroup references (e.g., ‘King Stephan’ is ingroup; ‘the 
French’ is outgroup in Hungarian texts). The Semantic Role Labeling Modules classifies Self and 
Other, as well as Ingroup and Outgroup into Agents and Recipients. The Negation Module is a 
cuckoo-egg in the system: it detects cases when agency, emotions, evaluations, and so on, are 
mentioned in negative modality (e.g., ‘I don’t like Peter’ is not a positive, but a negative 
emotion.) 
Thus, the program is able to generate quantitative measures of who feels, acts, evaluates, 
thinks, etc. what toward whom. The outcome of the process is a clear picture of the psychological 
composition of interpersonal and inter-group relations which are relevant for identity 
construction. 
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APPLYING NARRATIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Two domains where benefits of narrative social psychology and NarrCat have already been 
exploited are characterization of collective victim identity and elaboration of historical (collective) 
traumas. 
National identity has for a long time been in the forefront of social representation research 
(e.g., Augoustinos, 1993; Liu & László, 2007). Using NarrCat as an analytic device, we were able 
not only to characterize the social representation of the Hungarian national identity, but also to 
unpack underlying social psychological processes of the Hungarian identity construction. In 
various sorts of Hungarian historical narratives (school books, historical novels, media, folk 
stories) Hungarians as individuals or as groups are represented with less agency as compared to 
outgroups, particularly in negative events from the Hungarian perspective (László, Ferenczhalmy 
& Szalay, 2011). We also found a hyper evaluation of the ingroup, and a devaluation of the 
outgroups in the overwhelming majority of the significant events across the Hungarian history 
(Csertő & László, under review). By parsing mental processes as indicators of perspective taking, 
we had to notice that outgroup perspectives are represented if at all only when outgroups or their 
members show hostile, negative feelings or thoughts toward Hungarians (Vincze, Ilg & Pólya, 
2012).  A characteristic pattern of emotions attributed to Hungarian actors in historical texts such 
as fear, hope, enthusiasm, disappointment was also discovered (Fülöp, Csertő, Ilg, Slugoski, 
Szabó & László, 2012). Following Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori and Gundar, (2009), we 
subsumed these features of the narrative identity construction under the term collective 
victimhood.  
Being a victim of repeated traumas, losses, repressions and failures threatens the positive 
identity of a group, because these are opposed to the essential beliefs that the group is competent, 
strong or capable of resolving conflicts more difficult to maintain. Moreover, they may threaten 
the integrity or survival of the community. At the same time, the sense of collective victimhood 
may have certain identity-serving functions as well. It provides explanation for threatening 
events, through sense-making it helps the group cope with stress induced by a conflict; it gives 
moral justification and a feeling of superiority; it prepares the society for future harms; it 
enhances ingroup solidarity; it motivates patriotism, and can potentially gain international 
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support. Therefore, communities are motivated to maintain this status. By providing a scheme for 
interpreting subsequent intergroup events, assuming the victim position may become permanent. 
These ‘syndromes of victimhood’ may become a very dominant part of the repertoire of 
collective reactions, being transmitted through generations in channels of social communication 
and societal institutions (e.g. educational system, public and political discourses, traditions, rites, 
cultural products). Narrative social psychology and NarrCat helped us to uncover the social 
psychological processes that underlay collective victim identity, and also to show how its 
transmission proceeds (László & Ehmann, 2012) 
The second domain where we have used NarrCat is historical trauma elaboration. The 
process of group-level elaboration in history and collective memory has rarely been studied. 
Historical narratives as written accounts of past experiences are available sources of collective 
memory representations that make them valuable tool for identification while also enabling the 
empirical analysis of linguistic markers of trauma elaboration.  
One of the most significant events in the twentieth-century Hungarian national history 
was the collective trauma of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. The treaty ending the First World 
War for Hungary approved the detachment of approximately 2/3 of the nation’s territory with 3.3 
million Hungarian inhabitants, assigning the territory to neighbouring countries. Although till the 
end of the Second World War there were temporary chances for the revision of the treaty, in 
1947, it was ultimately affirmed that meant re-traumatization for the nation.  
On longitudinal samples of daily newspaper articles and history school books, we have 
traced the Hungarian trauma elaboration process in 5 years intervals from 1920 to 2010.  NarrCat 
was able to map emotions, extreme words, denials, and ingroup-outgroup evaluations in all the 
material written on the Trianon treaty. Results showed that the elaboration process was highly 
dependent on the political context. In the first twenty years a gradually fading emotional intensity 
could be observed with a decreasing number of denials and extreme evaluations.  The revision of 
the Trianon treaty in 1938-40, the Second World War and the subsequent Paris Peace Treaty 
which reinforced the Trianon borders, can be conceived as a re-traumatisation. The forty year 
communist dictatorship banned any talk on the Trianon treaty, consequently the trauma 
elaboration was blocked. With the political system’s change in 1990 the Trianon treaty could 
again be thematised. By 2000 the emotionality level of the newspaper articles and the ingroup-
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outgroup evaluation pattern of the history school books had approximated that of the twenties-
thirties of the past century. However, political orientation of the newspapers is a significant 
factor: right wing media seems to be more emotional and more ingroup biased than left wing 
media. This increase in the symptoms characteristic of the early stages of trauma elaboration 
suggests that the historical trauma of the Trianon treaty is still alive. Its contemporary vividness 
is probably due to the re-traumatisation, to the long silence around it, and to the sharp ideological 
division surrounding it. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Social representations of history or collective memory involve narratives. This narrative 
discourse carries and expresses the social psychological processes of the construction of national 
identity. Long term characteristics of national identity can be traced through historical narratives, 
just as temporary changes. Intergroup agency, intergroup evaluations, intergroup perspective 
taking and collective emotions seem to be sensitive indicators of national identities. These 
psychological processes of identity construction are available for qualitative analysis, but with 
language technological tools such as NarrCat, this analysis can be made controlled, i.e. reliable 
and valid. 
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